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During a dialogue, agents exchange information with each other and need thus to deal with 
incoming information. For that purpose, they should be able to reason effectively about trust­
worthiness of information sources. This paper proposes an argument-based system that allows 
an agent to reason about its own beliefs and information received from other sources. An agent's 
beliefs are of two kinds: beliefs about the environment (like the window is closed) and beliefs 
about trusting sources (like agent i trusts agent j). Six basic forms of trust are discussed in 
the paper including the most common one on sincerity. Starting with a base which contains 
such information, the system builds two types of arguments: arguments in favour of trusting 
a given source of information and arguments in favour of believing statements which may be 
received from other agents. We discuss how the different arguments interact and how an agent 
may decide to trust another source and thus to accept information coming from that source. 
The system is then extended in order to deal with graded trust (like agent i trusts to some extent 
agentj). 
Keywords: trust; argumentation; modal logic 
1. Introduction
An increasing number of software applications are being conceived, designed, and implemented 
using the notion of autonomous agents. These applications vary from email filtering (Maes, 1996), 
through electronic commerce (Rodriguez, Noriega, Sierra, & Padget, 1997; Wellman, 1993), to 
large industrial applications (Jennings et al., 1996). In all of these disparate cases, the agents are 
autonomous in the sense that they have the ability to decide for themselves which goals they 
should adopt and how these goals should be achieved (Wooldridge & Jennings, 1995). In most 
such applications, the autonomous components need to internet with one another because of the 
inherent interdependencies which exist between them. They need to communicate in order to 
resolve differences of opinion and conflicts of interest that result from differences in preferences, 
work together to find solutions to dilemmas and to construct proofs that they cannot manage 
alone, or simply to inform each other of pertinent facts. In other words they need the ability 
to engage in dialogues. Consequently, agents should be able to manage and deal with trust in 
information sources. In negotiation dialogues, for instance, one makes contracts with trustworthy 
agents. More generally, agents consider information coming from other sources only if these 
latter are trustworthy. As a result of this requirement on providing agents with the ability to deal 
with trust, an important amount of work has been done. Two main categories of works can be 
distinguished: 
• Works on understanding and formalising the notion of trust in information sources. Such
works try to answer the question: what does the sentence 'agent x trusts agent y' mean?
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Examples of answers can be found in Castelfranchi (2011), Castelfranchi and Falcone 
(2000), Falcone, Piunti, Venanzi, and Castelfranchi (2013), Marsh (1994). In Demolombe 
(1998, 2001), it is argued that trust is generally not absolute but rather concems some 
properties of an agent like his or her competence, sincerity, cooperativity . .. 
• Works on reasoning about trust. The idea is to decide whether to trust or not a given source
of information. Two categories of models are particularly proposed: (i) statistics-based
models (Matt, Morge, & Toni 201 0; Shi, Bochmann, & Adams 2005) which rel y on past
behaviour of a source in order to predict its future behaviour. (ii) logical models (Demolombe,
2004; Demolombe & Lorini, 2008) which infer trust in some properties from trust in other
properties.
Besides, since the seminal book by Walton and Krabbe (1995) in which they distinguished 
between six types of dialogues, there has been much work on providing agents with the ability to 
engage in such dialogues. Typically, these focus on one type of dialogue like persuasion (Amgoud, 
Maudet, & Parsons, 2000), inquiry (Black & Hunter, 2009), negotiation (Sycara, 1990) and delib­
eration (McBumey, Hitchcock, & Parsons, 2007). Furthermore, Walton and Krabbe emphasised 
the need to argue in dialogues in order to convince other parties to accept opinions or offers. Con­
sequently, in most works on modelling dialogues, agents are equipped with argumentation systems 
for reasoning about their own beliefs, building arguments and evaluating arguments received from 
other sources. While this use of argumentation is a common theme in all work mentioned above, 
none of those proposais consider trust in information sources when dealing with incoming infor­
mation or when making deals with other agents. They rather assume that agents are trustworthy 
and accept any information (respectively, offer) sent by any agent as soon as it does not contradict 
their own beliefs (respectively, it satisfies their goals). However, agents are not necessarily neither 
sincere nor reliable as argued in the huge literature about trust in information sources. This would 
mean that in existing works, agents may accept daims even if their sources are not trustworthy. 
They may also make deals with unreliable agents. 
This paper fills the gap by proposing an argumentation system that agents may use in dialogues 
for reasoning about different kinds of beliefs including beliefs about trust in information sources. 
The system fulfils thus three tasks. It states whether: 
• to believe in a given statement
• to trust or not a given source
• to accept or not an information/ offer received from a source.
We consider a fine-grained notion of trust as opposed to absolute trust. Indeed, an agent trusts 
(or distrusts) another agent in a given property and not in absolute way. For instance, one may trust 
someone is his sincerity but not in his competence. In this paper, we focus on the six properties 
identified by Demolombe (1998, 2004), namely validity, completeness, sincerity, cooperativity, 
competence and vigilance. In the first part of the paper, trust is considered as a binary notion, i.e. 
an agent either trusts in a given property of an entity or not. The system starts with a belief base 
which is encoded in modal logic and which contains formulas expressing information about the 
environment (e.g. my car is red) and information about trust (e.g. agent i trusts in the sincerity of 
agent}). It builds arguments in favour of statements and establishes the attacks between them. The 
arguments are evaluated using Dung's semantics (Dung, 1995), and finally the inferences to be 
drawn from the base are identified. We show that the system satisfies nice properties, namely the 
rationality postula tes defined in Amgoud (2013) about consistency and closure under consequence 
operator. In the second part of the paper, the system is extended in order to deal with graded trust as 
developed in Demolombe (2009) and in Demolombe and Liau (2001 ). The logical language that is 
used for representing beliefs is extended in such a way to encode certainty degrees of beliefs (such 
as, agent i has some doubts about climate change) and regularities degrees of relationships between 
facts (such as, if we are in London, it rains almost every day). From these two kinds of degrees, 
each argument is assigned an importance level which may not be the same for all arguments. 
Finally, arguments are evaluated using not only the attack relation but also a preference relation 
issued from the importance levels of arguments. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the logical formalism that will be used 
for representing and reasoning about agent's beliefs. Section 3 defines the six forms of trust that 
were initially introduced in Demolombe (2004), Lorini and Demolombe (2008) in case of binary 
trust. Section 4 presents the argumentation system as well as it properties. Section 5 presents 
the graded version of trust as proposed in Demolombe (2009), Demolombe and Liau (2001), 
and an argumentation system that can take into account varying degrees of trust and beliefs. 
Section 6 compares our model with existing works on argumentation-based trust. The last section 
concludes. 
2. Logical formalism
This section introduces the logical framework (i.e. the logical language [, and its axiomatics) that 
will be used for representing and reasoning about beliefs and trust in information sources. The 
syntactic primitives of[, are the following: 
• ATOM: set of atomic propositions denoted by p, q, r, .. .
• AGENT: a non-empty set of agents denoted by i,j, k, .. .
The language [, is the set of formulas defined by the following BNF: 
where p ranges over ATOM and i and j range over AGENT. The other logical connectives are 
defined as usual. The intuitive meaning of the modal operators is: 
• Belicp 1 : agent i believes that cp holds
• Infj,icp: agent} has informed agent i that cp holds
The axiomatics of the logic are the axiomatics of a Propositional Multi Modal Logic (Chellas, 
1980). Indeed, in addition to the axiomatics of Classical Propositional Calculus we have the 
following axiom schemas and inference rules. 
(K) Belï ( cp ➔ VI) ➔ (Belïcfa ➔ Beldr)
(D) -,(Belïcfa /\ Beli-,cp)
(Nec) IH- cp, then � Belïcfa 
Roughly speaking the intuitive meaning of (K) is that agent i can apply the modus ponens rule 
to derive consequences, (D) means that i's beliefs are not inconsistent and (Nec) means that i is 
not ignorant of the logical truths. 
The modal operator Infj,i obeys the following axiom schemas: 
(EQV) If� cp ++ 1/r, then � lnfj,icp ++ Infj,i VI 
(CONJ) Infj,i(/J /\ Infj,ïo/ ➔ Infj,i(cp /\ 1/r) 
(OBS) Inf. ·"" ➔ Bel ·lnf. .A-1,z'P 1 ],l'fl' 
(OBS') -,Jnf. .A- ➔ BeJ.-,Jnf. .A-
1,1'1-" l ],l'fl' 
The intuitive meaning of (EQV) is that informing actions about two logically equivalent for­
mulas have the same effects. For instance, to inform about the fact John is at home and John is 
working has the same eff ects as to inform about the fact that John is working and John is at home. 
The meaning of (CONJ) is that to inform about the fact John is at home and to inform about the 
fact John is working has the same effects as to inform about the fact John is working at home. 
The justification of this axiom schema is that informing actions are considered at an abstract level 
and two distinct concrete actions may be considered as the 'same' action if they produce the same 
effect on the receiver's beliefs. The axiom schemas (OBS) and (OBS') assume that if an agentj 
informs (respectively, does not inform) an agent i about cp, then i is aware of this fact. This would 
mean that the communication channels are assumed to be perfect. 
According to Chellas' terminology, modalities such as Beli obey a normal system KD and 
modalities of the kind Infj,i obey a particular kind of classical system. Axiom schemas (OBS) and 
(OBS') show how these two kinds of modalities internet. 
ln the sequel, the symbol 1- refers to the consequence operator that is based on the previous 
axiom schemas. Besides, a belief base is a subset of[, which contains the beliefs of a given agent 
i E AGENT.
3. Binary trust in information sources
Throughout this section, we consider two interacting agents i and j and assume that i receives a 
piece of information cp E [, from agent j. An important question is then what is the effect of this 
action on what the receiver believes? In Demolombe (1998, 2004), it was argued that this depends 
on the sender's properties the receiver trusts in. Six properties were particularly distinguished and 
investigated: 
Trust in sincerity: sincerity is the relationship between what the trustee says and what he believes. 
For instance, the fact that Juliet trusts Romeo in his sincerity about the fact Juliet is beautiful 
means that Juliet believes that if Romeo says to Juliet that she is beautiful, then Romeo believes 
that she is beautiful. The general definition is: the truster believes that if he or she is informed by 
the trustee about some proposition, then the trustee believes that this proposition is true. Formally: 
TrustSinc(i,j, cp) � Bel/lnfj,icp ➔ Beljcp ). 
lt is worth mentioning that the fact that an agent i believes in the sincerity of another agent j
regarding proposition cp does not mean that i believes cp. The claim may be false andj is not aware 
about that. A strong version of sincerity is the property of validity. 
Trust in validity: validity is the relationship between what the trustee says and what is true. For 
instance , the fact that Romeo trusts Juliet in her validity about the fact that Juliet loves Romeo 
means that Romeo believes that if Juliet says to Romeo that she loves him, then it is true that she 
loves him. The general definition is: the truster (i) believes that if he or she is informed by the 
trustee (j) about some proposition, then this proposition is true. 
Trust in completeness: completeness is the relationship between what is true and what the trustee 
says; it is the dual of validity. For instance the fact that Romeo trusts Juliet in her completeness 
about the fact that Juliet loves Romeo means that Romeo believes that if it is true that Juliet loves 
him, then Juliet will tell Romeo that she loves him. The general definition is: the truster believes 
that if some proposition is true, then the truster is informed by the trustee about this proposition. 
TrustCmp(i ,j, cp) def Bel;(cp ➔ Infj,icp ). 
Trust in cooperativity: cooperativity is the relationship between what the trustee believes and 
what he says; it is the dual of sincerity. For instance, the fact that Juliet trusts Romeo in his 
cooperativity about the fact Juliet is beautiful means that Juliet believes that if Romeo believes 
that she is beautiful, then Romeo says to her that she is beautiful. The general definition is: the 
truster believes that if the trustee believes that some proposition is true, then the truster is informed 
by the trustee about this proposition. 
def TrustCoop(i,j, </>) = Beli(Belj</> --+ Infj,i</> ). 
Trust in competence: competence is the relationship between what the trustee believes and what is 
true. For instance, the fact that Juliet trusts Romeo in his competence about the fact that the door 
of her house is closed means that Juliet believes that if Romeo believes that the door of her house 
is closed, then it is true that the door is closed. The general definition is: the truster believes that 
if the trustee believes that some proposition is true, then this proposition is true. 
Trust in vigilance: vigilance is the relationship between what is true and what the trustee believes; 
it is the dual of competence. For instance, the fact that Juliet trusts Romeo in his vigi'Iance about 
the fact that the door of her house is closed means that Juliet believes that if it is true that the 
door of her house is closed, then Romeo believes that the door of her house is closed. The general 
definition is: the truster believes that if some proposition is true, then the trustee believes that this 
proposition is true. 
TrustVigi(i,j, </>) <lef Beli(</> --+ Belj</> ).
In Parsons et al. (2012) other properties, called argument schemes, are discussed like trust 
in agent's reputation or trust in agent's character. For the purpose of the paper, we only focus 
on the six above properties and propose a formal framework for reasoning with and about 
them. 
Remarks It is worth mentioning that the presented definitions of trust are specific to particular 
propositions. For instance, a patient (p) may trust in the competence of his or her doctor (d) 
regarding diagnosis g 1• This is represented by the formula Belp (Beldg 1 --+ g1). This does not mean 
that the patient also trusts the doctor on another diagnosis g2• Note also that the six formulas are 
elements of .C. 
As said before, completeness is the dual of validity, cooperativity is the dual of sincerity and 
vigilance is the dual of competence (Figure 1). The dual properties play a significant role. Let us 
consider the case where the trustee is a guard in charge of informing people living in a building 
if the elevator fails. If these people trust the guard's completeness, they infer that the elevator is 
working from the fact they have not received a warning from the guard. 
It is also easy to show that the six properties are not independent. Indeed, trust in validity 
follows from trust in sincerity and trust in competence. Similarly, trust in completeness follows 
from trust in vigilance and trust in cooperativity. In formal terms we have: 
(V) 1-- TrustSinc(i,j, <p) /\ TrustComp(i,j, </>) --+ TrustVal(i,j, <p)
(C) 1-- TrustVigi(i,j, </>) /\ TrustCoop(i,j, <p) --+ TrustCmp(i,j, <p)
j Inf01ms i about p 
Cooperativity 
pis true Vigilance j Believes p 
Compet ence 
Figure 1. Relationships between believing, informing and truth. 
The effects of informing actions depending on the different kinds of trust are summarised 
below: 
(El) 1--TrustSinc(i,j,</>) ➔ (lnfj,i</> ➔ BeliBelj</>) 
(E2) 1-- TrustVal(i,j, </>) ➔ (lnfj ,i</> ➔ Beli</>) 
(E3) 1-- TrustCoop(i,j, </>) ➔ (-ilnfj,i</> ➔ Beli-i Belj</>) 
(E4) 1-- TrustCmp(i,j, </>) ➔ (-ilnfj,i</> ➔ Beli-i</>) 
Property (E2) (resp. (E4)) shows sufficient conditions about trust that guarantee that performing 
(resp. not performing) the action In½,ï<P has the effect that i believes that </> is true (resp. false). 
Notice that from i's trust inj competence (resp. trust vigilance) performing (resp. not performing) 
the action Infj,i</> does not allow i to infer that </> is true (resp. false). For instance, even if i trusts 
the doctor j's competence about cancer diagnosis, i may not trust the doctor's sincerity, and if the 
doctor tells i that he or she has no cancer, i will not believe this. The reason why i does not trust 
the doctor's sincerity may be that i believes that the doctor wants to protect i from bad news. 
The effects of informing actions can be derived from the different kinds of assumptions about 
the trust relationships between agents. For instance, if the truster i trusts j's sincerity about the 
proposition </> and j informs i about </>, the truster can infer that the trustee believes what s/he 
has transmitted to him or her (i). If, in addition, the truster trusts j's competence (i.e. the formula 
Beli(Belj</> ➔ </>) is in the beliefs base of agent i), then the truster can infer that </> is true. Notice 
that this consequence is in the scope of what the truster believes (i.e. what is inferred is Beli</> 
and not </>). Let us assume, for instance, that the truster i has some disease, j is a doctor and j tells 
i that i has a flu. If i trusts the doctor's sincerity about this diagnosis, i can infer that the doctor 
does believe that i has a flu. If i also trusts the doctor's competence, i can infer that s/he has a 
flu. Then, the final effect of what the doctor said is that i believes that the doctor believes that i 
has a flu and also that i believes that s/he has a flu. Notice that, if i trusts the doctor only in his 
or her validity, the effect of what the doctor said is that i believes that s/he has a flu but it is not 
necessarily the case that i believes that the doctor believes that i has a flu (see Demolombe 2011). 
Indeed, it could be the case that i believes that the doctor just transmits a diagnosis that has been 
made by an assistant who is trusted to be sincere and competent, while the doctor is not. From a 
formai point of view, it is not necessarily the case that contraposition of property (V ) holds. 
4. Argumentation-based reasoning system
Argumentation is seen as a reasoning process in which arguments are built and evaluated in order 
to increase or decrease the acceptability of a given standpoint. The latter may be a belief, an 
action, a goal, etc. Argumentation has become an artificial intelligence keyword for the last 20 
years. In its essence, argumentation can be seen as a particularly useful and intuitive paradigm for 
doing non-monotonie reasoning. The advantage of argumentation is that the reasoning process is 
composed of modular and qui te intuitive steps, and thus avoids the monolithic approach of many 
traditional logics for defeasible reasoning. An argumentation process starts with the construction 
of a set of arguments from a given know ledge base. As some of these arguments may attack each 
other, one needs to apply a criterion for determining the sets of arguments that can be regarded as 
acceptable: the so-called extensions. 
In what follows, we propose an argumentation system for reasoning about the different kinds 
of beliefs an agent i may have, in particular beliefs about trust in information sources. The system 
instantiates the abstract framework of Dung (1995) and uses one of its semantics in order to 
evaluate arguments. Before presenting the system, we start by recalling briefly Dung's framework 
and then show how arguments in favour of beliefs can be built and how these arguments may 
interact with each other. 
4.1. Dung's abstract argumentation framework 
The most abstract argumentation framework in the literature was proposed by Dung (1995). It 
consists of a set of arguments and a binary relation expressing attacks between the arguments. 
Both notions (i.e. arguments and attacks) are abstract entities and thus their origin and structure 
are left unspecified. 
DEFINITION 4.1 An argumentation framework is a pair (A, R) where A is a set of arguments and 
R s; A x A is an attack relation. 
A pair ( a, b) E R means that a attacks b. A set [ � A attacks an argument b iff :3a E [ such 
that (a, b) E R. We sometimes use the infix notation aRb to denote (a, b) ER.
An argumentation framework (A, R) is seen as a graph whose nodes are the arguments of 
A and its edges are the attacks in R. The arguments are evaluated using a semantics. In Dung 
(1995), different semantics were proposed, and some of them were refined, for instance in Baroni, 
Giacomin, and Guida (2005) and Dung, Mancarella, and Toni (2007). For the purpose of the paper, 
we only recall stable semantics since our aim is not to discuss the outcomes of our system under 
all semantics, but rather to show how to build arguments in favour of trust in information sources 
and how to decide to accept information coming from sources. Thus, we only need one semantics 
for illustration purposes. 
DEANITION 4.2 Let T = (A, R) be an argumentation framework and [ s; A. [ is a stable 
extension iff: 
• �a,b E [ such that (a,b) ER
• [ attacks any argument in A \ [
Ext(T) denotes the set of all stable extensions of T. 
It is worth recalling that stable extensions are maximal (for set inclusion) non-conflicting sets 
of arguments. 
Example 4.3 Let us consider the argumentation framework T = (A, R) such that: 
• A= {a,b,c,d,e,f,g}
• R = { (c, b), (b, e), (e, c), (d, c), (a, d), (d, a), (a,f), (f, g)}
This framework has five maximal (for set inclusion) non-conflicting sets of arguments: 
• E1 = {a,c,g},
• E2 = {d, e,f},
• [3 = {b, d,f},
• [4 = {a, e, g}, and
• Es = {a, b, g}.
It has one stable extension [3, i.e. Ext(TI = {[3}. 
An argumentation framework may be infinite, i.e. its set of arguments may be infinite. 
Consequently, it may have an infinite number of extensions (under a given semantics). 
4.2. Binary trust supported by arguments 
This section introduces an argumentation system for reasoning about the different kinds of beliefs 
an agent i may have. As already said, argumentation is an alternative approach for reasoning with 
inconsistent information. It follows three main steps: (i) constructing arguments and counterargu­
ments from a logical belief base, (ii) defining the status of each argument, and (iii) specifying the 
conclusions to be drawn from the base. In what follows, we focus on a given agent i and propose 
a model for reasoning about his beliefs. The model instantiates Dung's framework by defining all 
the above items. 
Starting from the logic (J:,, f---) described in Section 2 and a possibly inconsistent beliefs base 
JC,i � J:,, the system computes a consistent set of beliefs the agent should rel y on. The base JC,i can 
be seen as the i's 'candidate' beliefs. It may contain trust information as defined in the previous 
section ( e.g. Beli ( </J -+ Be11<t>) ), beliefs about the environment ( e.g. Beli<P where </J stands for 'the 
window is closed') and beliefs about informing actions received from other agents ( e.g. BelJnfJ,i<P ). 
Note that the base JC,i = {Belilnf;J<P, BelJnf;,i-,<P} is not inconsistent. Here agent i believes that 
he was informed by j that both formulas </J and -,4> hold. However, the base JC,i = {Beli<P, Be}i-,<P} 
is inconsistent. 
The system is a logical instantiation of the abstract framework proposed by Dung (1995) in 
his seminal paper. It consists thus of a set of arguments, an attack relation between the arguments 
and a semantics for evaluating the arguments. The arguments are built from the base JC,i. They are 
logical proofs for formulas in ,C that satisfy two requirements: consistency and minimality. 
DEFINITION 4.4 An argument built from a belief base JC,i is a pair (H, h) where: 
• H � Ki and h E ,C
• H is consistent
• H f---h
• �H' c H such that H' f---h
His called the support of the argument and h its conclusion. Arg(Ki) is the set of all arguments 
that can be built from Ki.
Let us illustrate this notion of argument with an example. 
Example 4.5 Assume the following belief base of agent i: 
Beli(8), Beli(Infj,ï<P ),
JC = Beli (-iinfk ,i<p), Bet (Infj,i<P ➔ Belj</>), Beli ( <p ➔ Infk,i<p). From JC, an infinite number of arguments is built including the following ones: (1) ({BeU8)},Beli(8))(2) ( {Beli (Infj,i<P)}, Beli (Infj,i<P))(3) ( {Beli (-iinfk,i<p)}, Beli (-iinfk ,;<p))( 4) ( {BeUinfj,i<P ➔ Belj</>), Beli (Infj,ï<P)}, Beli (Belj</>))(5) ({BeU<p ➔ Infk,i<p),Beli(-,Infk,i(())},Beli-,<p)
The previous arguments support various beliefs of agent i. Sorne of them, like (4) and (5), make use of beliefs on trust in information sources. To put it differently, they rely on agent's trust in order to make inferences. Such arguments are very useful in dialogue systems where agents may receive new information from other entities and should thus decide whether to accept it or not. Arguments may also support the six forms of trust we discussed in Section 3. They show whether agent i should or should not trust another agent in one of the properties (sincerity, validity, cooperativity, completeness and competence). Let us consider the following example. 
Example 4.6 Assume the following base: 
1 Beli(<p) � TrustSinc(i,j, </> ),Ki = TrustVal(z, k, <p ),Beli (Infk,i<p), where i is the programme chair of a conference, k is an area chair member of the programme committee and j is a reviewer. Assume that <p stands for 'j makes fair reviews' and </> for 'j makes a fair review for paper ID x'. Examples of arguments that are built from this base are the following ones: (1) ({Beli(Infk ,i<p)}, Bel;(Infk,i(fJ))(2) ({Beli(Infk,i<p), TrustVal(i, k, <p) }, Beli<p)(3) ({Beli(Infk,i<p), TrustVal(i, k, <p),Beli<p ➔ TrustSinc(i,j, </>)}, TrustSinc(i,j, </>))Note that the argument (3) is in favour of trusting in the sincerity of agent} regarding proposition</>. 
The second component of an argumentation framework is its attack relation which expresses conflicts that may raise between arguments. In argumentation literature, several relations were proposed (see Gorogiannis and Hunter (2011) for a summary of relations proposed for proposi­tional frameworks). Sorne of them, like the well-known rebutting, are symmetric. However, it was shown in Amgoud and Besnard (2009) that any argumentation framework which is grounded on 
a Tarskian logic Tarski (1956) and uses a symmetric attack relation may violate the rationality 
postulates proposed in Caminada and Amgoud (2007), namely the one on consistency. Indeed, 
such a framework may have an extension which supports inconsistent conclusions. Since modal 
logic is a particular case of Tarski's logics, then the argumentation system we propose here will 
suffer from the same problem as shown in the following example. 
Example 4. 7 Let us consider the following belief base: 
Let us consider the following arguments: 
• a1 = ({Beli(</J)},Belï(</J))
• a2 = ({BeU-,<p)},Bet(-,<p))
• a3 = ( {Beli( </J -+ <p) }, Beli(<P -+ <p))
• a4 = ({Beli(<P ), Beli(</J -+ <p) }, Beli(<p))
• as = ({Beli(-,<p ), Bet(</J -+ <p) }, BeU-,</J))
• a6 = ({Beli(</J),BeU-,<p)},Beli(<P A -,<p))
Let R be the rebutting relation defined as follows: (H, h) rebuts (H', h') iff h = B eli </J, 
h' = Beli<P and </J = -,<p. Note that this relation is symmetric. The attacks among arguments are 
as depicted in figure above. The set {a1 ,a2,a3} is a stable extension of (Arg(Ki), R). How­
ever, {Beli ( </J), Beli (-,<p), Beli ( </J -+ <p)} is inconsistent. This means that the extension supports 
contradictory conclusions! 
In what follows we avoid thus symmetric relations. We discuss next various forms of attacks. 
The first one is the so-called assumption-attack proposed in Elvang-G0ransson, Fox, and Krause 
(1993). It consists of weakening an argument by undermining one of its premises (i.e. an element 
of its support). 
DEFINITION 4.8 Let (H, h), (H', h') be two arguments of Arg(Ki). (H, h) assumption-attacks 
(H', h') iff there exists h" EH' such that h = Beli</J and h" = Beli-,<P· 
Let us illustrate this relation on the following example. 
Example 4.9 Let us consider the following base: 
Beli (lnfJ,i<P -+ Bel1</J), 
Bet(lnfJ,i<P -+ </J), 
BeUinfJ,i<P ), 
Bel; (-,</J). 
The argument ( {Beli (lnf1,;</J -+ </J), Beli (-,</J)}, Beli (-,JnfJ,i<P)) assumption attacks the argument 
( {Beli (lnfJ ,i<P -+ Bel1</J), Beli (lnfJ,i<P)}, Bet (Bel1</J)). 
It is worth mentioning that this attack relation concerns all types of arguments that may be 
built from a beliefs base (i.e. arguments supporting ordinary beliefs and those supporting trust in 
information sources). The following definition introduces another way for attacking arguments in 
favour of trust in an agent's sincerity. The basic idea is to show a case where the trusted agent sent 
an information that s/he does not believe. To put it differently, the attack consists of proving that 
the trustee may lie. 
DEFINITION 4.10 Let (H, h), (H', h') be two arguments of Arg(K,i). (H, h) sinc-attacks (H', h') 
iff h = Beli (lnfj,i'P /\ -iBeljcp) and TrustSinc ( i ,j, cp) E H'. 
An argument in favour of trust in validity may also be undermined by an argument whose 
conclusion is a formula which is sent by the trusted agent and which is invalid (i.e. it does not 
hold). 
DEFINITION 4.11 Let (H, h), (H', h') be two arguments of Arg(K,ï). (H, h) val-attacks (H', h') iff 
h = Beli(lnfj,i'P /\ -i<p) and TrustVal(i,j,<f>) EH' . 
Similarly, an argument in favour of trust in completeness may be attacked. Recall that such an 
argument provides a reason for believing that if a given formula holds, then the truster agent will 
be informed about it by the trustee. An attacker highlights a formula which holds and for which 
the trustee does not send any message. 
DEFINITION 4.12 Let (H, h), (H', h') be two arguments of Arg(K,i). (H, h) com-attacks (H', h') 
iff h = Beli(cp /\ -,Jnfj,i'P) and TrustCmp(i,j, <f>) E H'. 
Recall that trust in the cooperativity of an agent means that if he believes a statement, then 
he will inform the truster about it. An attack against an argument supporting such information 
consists of presenting a case where the trustee was not cooperative. 
DEFINITION 4.13 Let (H, h), (H', h') be two arguments of Arg(K,J. (H, h) coop-attacks (H', h') 
iff h = Belï(Beljcp /\ -,Jnfj,ï'P) and TrustCoop(i,j, <f>) EH'. 
An argument in favour of trust in the competence of an agent may be attacked by an argument 
supporting a statement that is believed by this agent but which is not true. 
DEFINITION 4.14 Let (H, h), (H', h') be two arguments of Arg(K,i). (H, h) comp-attacks (H', h') 
iff h = Beli(Beljcp /\ -icp) and TrustComp(i,j, <f>) EH'. 
Trust in an agent's vigilance may be attacked by exhibiting a claim which holds but is ignored 
by the agent. 
DEFINITION 4.15 Let (H,h), (H',h') be two arguments of Arg(K,ï). (H,h) vigi-attacks (H',h') 
iff h = Beli(cp /\ -iBeljcp) and TrustVigi(i,j,<f>) EH'. 
Remark It is worth mentioning that assumption-attack relation is confiict-dependent, i.e. if (H, h) 
attacks (H', h') then H U H' is necessarily inconsistent. This is not the case for the six other relations 
as shown in the following example. 





Assume that efJ stands for 'The weather is cloudy' and <p stands for 'People pay few taxes'. Note 
that the base Ki is consistent. However, the argument ( {Beli(Inf1,icp ), Beli(-,Bel1cp) }, Beli(Inf1,icp /\ 
-,Bel1cp)) sinc-attacks the argument ( {Beli (InfJ,i<P --+ Bel1<t>)}, Beli (Inf1,i<P --+ Bel1</J)). 
The seven forms of attacks are captured by a binary relation on the set of arguments which is 
denoted by ffi. 
DEFINITION 4.17 Let (H,h) and (H',h') be two arguments of Arg(Ki). (H,h) ffi (H',h') iff: 
• (H, h) assumption-attacks (H', h'), or
• (H, h) sinc-attacks (H', h'), or
• (H, h) val-attacks (H', h'), or
• (H, h) com-attacks (H', h'), or
• (H, h) coop-attacks (H', h'), or
• (H, h) comp-attacks (H', h'), or
• (H, h) vigi-attacks (H', h').
The following example shows that the attack relation ffi is not symmetric. 
Example 4.16 (Cont) It is easy to check that there is only one attack between arguments 
of Arg(Ki): ({Belï(Inf1J<p), Beli(-,Bel1cp)}, Beli(lnfJJ<p /\ -,Bel1cp)) ffi ({Bet(InfJ,i<P --+ Bel//>)}, 
Beli (InfJ,i<P --+ Bel1<t>). Thus, ffi is not symmetric. 
Next we show that the relation ffi may admit self-attacking arguments. 
Example 4.18 Let us consider the following base: 
I
TrustSinc(i,j, (/J),
Ki = Beli((InfJ,i<P --+ Bel1</J)--+ Beli(-,Bel1<p)),
Beli (Int,i<p). 
The argument ({TrustSinc(i,j,</J), Beli(Inf1,icp), Beli((Inf1,i<P --+ Bel1</J)--+ Beli(-,Bel1cp))},
Beli (Inf1,icp /\ --iBel1cp)) sinc-attacks itself. 
An argumentation system for reasoning about the beliefs of an agent is defined as follows. 
DEFINITION 4.19 An argumentation system built over a belief base Ki is a pair T = (Arg(Ki), fi) 
where fi � Arg(Ki) x Arg(Kï) is as given in Definition 4.17. 
Since arguments may be conflicting, it is important to define the acceptable ones. For that 
purpose, we use the stable semantics proposed in Dung (1995). This semantics allows to partition 
the powerset of the set of arguments into two sets: stable extensions and non-extensions. The 
extensions are used in order to define the inferences to be drawn from the belief base Ki of agent i.
These inferences represent what agent i should believe according to the available information. 
The idea is that a formula is inferred if it is supported by at least one argument in every extension. 
Note that the argument needs not to be the same in all the extensions. 
DEFINITION 4.20 Let T = (Arg(/Ci), ffi) be an argumentation system built over a beliefs base 
/Ci and Ext (T) its set of stable extensions. A formula cp E ,C is inferred from /Ci iff for all 
E E Ext(T), there exists (H, cp) E E. 
Output (T) denotes the set of all beliefs inferred from /Ci using system T. 
Example 4.9 (Cont) Let us consider the belief base /Ci of agent i. The set Arg(/Ci) of arguments 
is infinite. It contains among others the following arguments: 
a1 : ({Belï--,</>},Belï--,</>) 
a2: ({Beli(lnfj,i</> ➔ </>)},Beli(lnfj,i</> ➔ </>)) 
a3 : ( {Belï (Infj ,i</>)}, Beli (lnfj,i</>)) 
a4: ({Beli(lnfj ,i</> ➔ Belj</>)},Beli(lnfj,i</> ➔ Belj</>)) 
as : ( {Beli (lnfj,i</>), Beli (lnfj,i</> ➔ Belj</>)}, Beli (Belj</>)) 
a6: ({Beli(lnfj ,i</>),Beli(lnfj,i</> ➔ </>)},Beli</>) 
a1 : ({Beli--,</>, Beli(lnfj,i</> ➔ </>)}, {Beli(-.Jnfj,i</>)) 
as: ({Belï--,4>,Beli(lnfj,i</>)},Beli--,(lnfj,i</> ➔ <f>))
The following figure summarises the attacks between the eight arguments: 
It can be checked that the argumentation system T = (Arg(/Ci), ffi) bas three stable extensions. 
Note that we do not provide the complete result since Arg(/Ci) is infinite, but give some insights 
on the arguments that are included in the extensions. Below, if an argument ai (i = 1 ... 8) does 
not appear in an extension, then it does not belong to that extension. For instance, a 1 tj. E1 • 
• E1 = {a2, a3, a4, as, a6, .. . } 
• E2 = { a 1, a2, a4, a7, ... }
• [3 = {a1, a3, a4, as, as, ... }.
It is worth noticing that the argument a4 belongs to the three extensions. Thus, Beli (Inf1,icp ➔ 
Bel1cp) E Output (T) meaning that according to the available information, agent i believes in the 
sincerity of agentj regarding cp. However, Beli-.cp and Belic/J are supported by arguments only 
in some extensions. Then, Beli-.cp tj. Ou tpu t(T) and Belic/J (j. Ou tpu t(T) meaning that agent 
i ignores cp's truth value. 
Example 4.16 (Cont) The table below shows some arguments that may be built from /Ci. 
a1 : ({Bel;(lnfj,i</> ➔ Belj</>)},Beli(lnfj,i</> ➔ Belj</>)) 
a2 : ( {Beli (lnfj,i({J)}, Bel; (lnfj,i({J)) 
a3 : ( {Bel; (--,Belj<p)}, Beli (-.Belj<p)) 
a4: ({Belï(lnfj,i({J),Bel;(--,Belj<p)}, Bel;(lnfj,i({J /\ --,Belj<p)) 
The following figure summarises the attacks between the four arguments: 
e e e-e 
It can be checked that the argumentation system T = (Arg(Ki), ffi) has one stable exten­
sion: E = {a2,a3,a4, .. . }. Thus, Beli(InfJ,ï'P) E Output(T), Beli(-,Bel1<p) E Output(n but
Beli (InfJ,i<P ----+ Bel1</>) €j. Output (n. This means that agent i will no longer believe in the 
sincerity of agent } about <f>. 
4.3. Properties of the system 
Remember that a belief base of an agent may be inconsistent. We show that the set of inferences 
drawn from that base using the argumentation system is consistent. Before giving the formal result, 
we start by another property which shows that every stable extension of the system supports a 
consistent set of beliefs. Note that this property corresponds exactly to the rationality postulate 
on consistency that was proposed in Caminada and Amgoud (2007) for rule-based logics and 
generalised later in Amgoud (2013) for Tarskian logics. 
PROPOSITION 4.21 Let T = (Arg(Kï), ffi) be an argumentation system built over a beliefs base 
Ki and Ext(n its set of stable extensions. For all E E Ext(n, the following properties hold: 
• The set u (Hk,hk)EE Hk is consistent.
• The set {hl 3(H, h) E E} is consistent.




)EE Hk is 
inconsistent. Thus, 3X s; u (Hk,hk)EE Hk such that X is a minimal (wrt set inclusion) inconsistent set. 
Since each Hk is consistent, then IXI > 1. Thus, for all Bel(x) EX, X\ {Bel(x)} is a minimal set 
such that X \ {Bel(x)} 1-- Bel(-,x). Then, (X\ {Bel(x)},Bel(-,x)) and ({Bel(x)},Bel(x)) are both 
arguments. Moreover, (X\ {Bel(x)},Bel(-,x)) assumption-attacks ({Bel(x)},Bel(x)). Besides, 
3(H, h) E E such thatBel(x) E H. Thus, (X\ {Bel(x)}, Bel(-,x)) assumption-attacks (H, h). Since 
E is conflict-free, then (X\ {Bel(x) }, Bel(-,x)) (j. E and 3(H', h') E E such that (H', h')ffi(X \ 
{Bel(x)},Bel(-,x)). (1) Assume that (H',h') assumption-attacks (X\ {Bel(x)},Bel(-,x)). Thus, 
3Belx' E X \ {Bel(x)} such that H' 1-- Bel-,x'. However, Belx' E H" for some (H", h") E E.
Thus, (H', h') assumption-attacks (H", h"). This contradicts the fact that E is conflict-free. (2) 
Assume now that (H',h') sinc-attacks (X\ {Bel(x)},Bel(-,x)). Then, h' = Bel(inf i ,j,<p A-,Belj<p) 
and TrustSinc(i,},</>) EX\ {Bel(x). So, 3(H",h") E E such that TrustSinc(i,j,</>) EH". Thus, 
(H', h') assumption-attacks (H", h"). This contradicts the fact that E is conflict-free. The same 
reasoning holds for the remaining forms of attacks. Then, u
(Hk
,hdEE Hk is consistent. From the 
previous result, it follows that the set {hl 3(H, h) E E} is consistent as well. ■
lt is worth mentioning that the set of formulas used in the arguments of a stable extension is 
a consistent subbase of the beliefs base Ki but not necessarily maximal for set inclusion. This is 
mainly due to the six attack relations which are not based on inconsistency. Example 4.16 shows 
a case of a system built over a consistent beliefs base. The system has one stable extension E, and 




)EE Hk, is different from Ki. 
From this property of the system, it follows that the set Ou tpu t(n is also consistent. 
PROPOSITION 4.22 Let T = (Arg(Ki), ffi) be an argumentation system built over a beliefs base 
Ki. The set Output (T) is consistent. 
Proof From Definition 4.20, it follows that 0utput(T) � {hl 3(H, h) E E} for any E E 
Ext(T). Since {hl 3(H, h) E E} is consistent then so is 0utput(T). ■ 
The next property concems another rationality postulate in Amgoud (2013) which claims that 
the extensions should be closed under sub-arguments. The idea is that accepting an argument in 
a given extension implies accepting all its sub-parts in that extension. 
PROPOSITION 4.23 Let T = (Arg(Kï), ffi) be an argumentation system built over a beliefs base 
Ki. For all E E Ext(T), if (H, h) E E then for all (H', h') E Arg(Ki) such that H' � H, it holds 
that (H', h') E E. 
Proof Let E be a stable extension of T = (Arg(Ki), ffi). Let (H, h) E E and (H', h') E Arg(Ki) 
such that H' � H and (H', h') (/:. E. Then, 3(H", h") E E such that (H", h")fft(H', h'). (1) Assume 
that (H",h") assumption-attacks (H',h'). Then, 3Belx EH' such thath" = Bel-,x. But Belx EH 
since H' � H. So (H", h") assumption-attacks (H, h). This contradicts the fact that E is conflict­
free. (2) Assume now that (H", h") sinc-attacks (H', h'). Then, h" = Bel(infi,j,<p /\-,Belj <p) and 
TrustSinc(i,j,</>) EH'. Then TrustSinc(i,j,</>) EH. Consequently, (H",h") sinc-attacks (H,h). 
This contradicts the fact that E is conflict-free. The same reasoning holds for the remaining forms 
of attacks. ■ 
The next property concems the third rationality postulate in Amgoud (2013) which claims 
that the extensions should be closed under the consequence operator, f- in our case. This property 
guarantees that the system does not forget intuitive conclusions. Before presenting the formai 
result, let us first introduce a useful notation. 
Notation: For X � .C, CN(X) = {</> E ,CI X f-</> }. 
PROPOSITION 4.24 Let T = (Arg(Kï), ffi) be an argumentation system built over a beliefs base Ki 
andExt(T) its set of stable extensions.For allE E Ext(T), {hl 3(H,h) E E} =CN({h l 3(H,h) E 
E}). 
Proof Let E be a stable extension of the system T = (Arg(Ki), ffi). Let X=
{hl 3(H, h) E E}. Assume that Xi= CN(X). Thus, 3h E CN(X) and h (/:. X. Besides, X�
u
(Hk ,hk)EE CN(Hk) � CN(LJ (Hk ,hk)EE Hk). It follows also that CN(X) � CN(LJ (Hk ,hk)EE Hk) and thus 
h E CN(LJCHk ,hdEE Hk). Two possible cases:
(1) h E CN(0), (0, h) E Arg(Ki) but (0, h) (/:. E. This means that 3(H', h')ffi(0, h). But the
seven attack relations ensure h' E 0 or h' = Beix E 0 and h = Beix. This is impossible.
(2) h (/:. CN(0) and 3S � u
(Hk ,h k )EE Hk such that (S, h) E Arg(K;) since u (Hk ,hk)EE Hk is
consistent (see Proposition 4.21). Moreover, (S, h) (/:. E. Hence, 3(H', h') E E such that
(H', h')ffi(S, h). Assume that ffi is assomption attack. Then, h' = Bel-,x ES. But, this
implies that 3(H",h") E E such that Bel-,x EH" meaning that (H',h')ffi(H",h"). This
contradicts the fact that E is conflict-free. The same reasoning applies for the six remaining
relations since they are all based on attacking the support.
■ 
We show next that the set Output(T) is closed under f-. 
PROPOSITION 4.25 Let T = (Arg(Kï), ffi) be an argumentation system built over a beliefs base 
Ki such that Ext(T) i= 0. It holds that Output(T) = CN(Output(T)). 
Proof Let T = (Arg(JC), ffi) be a system built over a beliefs base Ki such that Ext(T) -:/=- 0. It 
is clear that Output(T) � CN(Output(T)). 
Assume now that h E CN(Output(T)) and h (j. Output(T). Then, :lh1, ... , hn E
Output(TI such that h E CN({h1, . .. 'hn}). Besides, h1, ... , hn E nEkEExt(T) {</> 1 :l(H, </>) E Ed.
From monotonicity of CN, it follows that: CN({h 1 , • • •  , hn}) � 
CN(nEkEExt(TI {</> 1 :l(H, </>) E Ek}). 1t holds also that h E CN({</> 1 :l(H, </>) E Ei}) n ... n
CN({</> 1 :l(H, </>) E En}). From Proposition 4.23, h E {</> 1 :l(H, </>) E Ed n ... n {</> 1 :l(H, </>) E En}.
Consequently, h E Output(TI. ■ 
This means, for instance, that if TrustSinc(i,j, </>) E Output(T) and Beli(Infj ,i</>) E
Output (TI, then Beli (Belj</>) E Output (T). 
5. Graded trust in information sources
In most situations it is an over-simplification to say that an agent i trusts ( or does not trust) another 
agentj. Rather, in informai terms, we may say that i has a limited trust inj, or i's trust inj is high. 
We are thus faced with the question: 'what is the meaning of graded trust?'.
Demolombe (2009) proposed two different answers to this question. The first answer, when 
trust is represented by a formula of the form Beli(</>
j => o/j), is that i is uncertain to be in a world 
where the set of </>j worlds (i.e. the set of worlds where </>j is true) is included in the set of o/j 
worlds (the set of worlds where o/j is true). For example, agent i may be uncertain about the fact 
that agent j is sincere about p, that is, about the fact that in every circumstance where j informs i 
about p, it is the case thatj believes p. Here, graded trust can be defined by the strength level of i's 
belief aboutj's sincerity. Notice that this uncertainty level refers to i's beliefs and not to the fact 
that j is more or less sincere. In more formai terms, according to this interpretation, graded trust 
can be represented by a formula 
Belf (</>j => l/rj) 
which is read as follows: the strength level of i's belief about the fact that '</>j => o/j is true' is g.
In the sequel, Belf denotes a 'graded belief of agent i. 
The second answer by Demolombe (2009) is: 'i believes that the set of </>j worlds is partially 
included in the set of o/j worlds'. In such a case, the fact that i's trust inj's sincerity is high can be 
interpreted as: i believes that in almost all circumstances, if j informs i about p, then j believes p.
According to this interpretation trust level refers to the regularity level of the relationship between 
the fact that </>j is true and the fact that o/j is true. Graded trust is thus formally represented by the 
formula: 
where h may be a numerical value which represents graded regularity.
For the purpose of our proposai, graded trust may refer to both kinds of levels (uncertainty and 
regularity). It is thus represented by formulas of the form: 
whose intended meaning is that the strength level of i's belief about the fact that </>j entails o/j with 
a regularity level h is g. It is worth pointing out that in general these two levels are independent. 
It may be the case, for example, that i strongly believes thatj's sincerity is low or that i strongly 
believes thatj's sincerity is high and it may also be the case that i has a low level of belief about 
the fact thatj's sincerity is low. 
5.1. Extended logic 
In what follows, we extend the logical language of Section 2 for reasoning about graded trust. Let 
us first recall the intuitive meaning of the new operators: 
• Belf<fJ: the strength level of i's belief about the fact that <jJ is true is (exactly) g.
• <P ⇒h 1/J: <jJ entails 1/J at level h.
• D<j): <jJ holds in all the situations.
The operator □ is introduced for formal purposes that are explained below. We also assume
two additional sets that contain levels of beliefs and regularity: 
• GRB: finite set of belief levels.
• GRR: finite set of regularity levels.
Notice that no particular assumption is made on the nature of the elements of these sets.
However, we assume that they are both equipped with a preordering � (i.e. a reflexive and transitive 
binary relation). For x, y E GRB (respectively, in x, y E GRR), x � y means that y is at least as 
strong as x. The strict relation associated with � is denoted by < and defined as follows: x < y def
(x �y)/\ not(y � x). Moreover, both sets has a lower and an upper bounds denoted, respectively, 
min and max.2 For every x in GRB or in GRR, min � x � max.
Notations: Forall(g, cond)F(g) 
def 
/\gEG,cond(g) F(g), Exist(g, cond)F(g) �- V gEG,cond(g)F(g)' and 
VI h def T =} h VI. 




















If 1- </> ++ 1/r then 1- Belf (</>) ++ Belf (1/r)
If 1- </> ➔ 1/r then 1- Belf(<t>) ➔ -,Exist(g',g' < g)Beif 1/r
If g3 = Max{g 1 , g2} then 1- Belf1 (</>1) /\ Belf2 (</>2) ➔ Belf3 (</>1 V </>2)
If g3 = Min{g 1 ,g2} then 1- Belf1 (</>1) /\ Belf2 (</>2) ➔ Belf3 (</>1 /\ </>2)
I---Forall(g1,g2,g1 -=fag2) -,(Belf1 (</>)/\Belf2 (<t>)) 
1- Belf </> ➔ Beli</>
1- (Belfù1 </> /\ Belf 1/r) ➔ □ ( </> ➔ 1/r)
1- (Belfru-</> /\ Belf 1/r) ➔ □(1/r ➔ </>)
If 1- </> then 1- Bel fax</>
1- Belf ( </>) ➔ BeliBelf ( </>)
1- -.Belf (</>) ➔ Beli-,Belf (</>)
If 1- </> ++ <t>' and 1- 1/r � 1/r' then 1- (</> =}h 1/r) ➔ (</>' =}h 1/r')
1- (</> =}h 1/r) ➔ (</> ➔ 1/rh)
If n = Max{Min{h1, k1}, Min{h2, k2}}, then
1- ((</> =}/q 1/r) /\ (</> /\ 1/r =}k1 0)/\
(</> =}h2 -,1/r) /\ (</> /\ -,1/r =}k2 0)) ➔ 
(</> =}n 0)
1--- Forall(h 1 ,h2,h 1 -=fa h2) -,((</> =}h 1 1/r) /\ (</> =}h2 1/r)) 
1- (</> =}min 1/r) tt D(</> ➔ -,1/r)
1- (</> =}mru- 1/r) ++ D(</> ➔ 1/1)3 
If Belf </> and 1- </> ➔ 1/r, then -,Exist(g', g' < g )Beif 1/r.
The first rule (SubstBel), states that in Belf (</) ), <j) can be substituted by any logically equivalent 
formula. (Weak) says that if 1/J is a logical consequence of <j) (i.e. 1-- <j) ➔ 1/1 ), then, if i has 
ascribed a strength level to his or her belief about <j) and to his· or her belief about 1/1, then the 
level of 1/f cannot be lower than the level of cp. (ClosDisj) says that if the levels of beliefs of 
two formulas (/)1 and cp2 are fixed, then the level of their disjunction is the maximum of these 
two levels. With (ClosConj) schema, if the levels of beliefs of two formulas c/J1 and c/J2 are fixed, 
then the level of their conjunction is the minimum of these two levels. (UnicBel) states that the 
strength level of i's belief is unique for every sentence. According to (Consist) schema, graded 
beliefs are considered as standard beliefs to which an agent i bas assigned a strength level. It 
may be that i has not assigned a strength level to some belief, for instance, because s/he bas 
no argument to assign it such or such level. According to this axiom schema Belf ( efJ) can be 
rephrased as: i believes cp and the strength level of this belief is g. The axiom schema (MinBel) 
states that if efJ represents the formula which is believed at the minimum level and 1/f is believed 
at some belief level, then efJ implies 1/f. It is worth noticing that this axiom is consistent with 
(ClosConj). From an intuitive point of view a formula which is believed at the minimal level 
is a formula which denotes a proposition which is more specific than any other formula which 
is believed at any other level. That means that the set of cp worlds is included into the set of 1/f 
worlds. (MaxBel) says that if efJ represents the formula which is believed at the maximum level 
and 1/f is believed at some belief level, then 1/f implies cp. This axiom schema is consistent with 
(ClosDisj). From an intuitive point of view a formula which is believed at the maximal level is 
a formula which denotes a proposition which is less specific than any other formula which is 
believed at any other level. This means that the set of cp worlds contains the set of 1/f worlds. 
The schema (MaxTau) states that if efJ is a theorem of the logic, then the belief level of </J is 
max. According to schema (Poslnt), if a formula cp is believed at level g, then i believes, in the 
standard sense, that cp is believed at level g. This positive introspection axiom schema means that 
no level is ascribed by i to bis or ber evaluation of the level of a belief. If such a level would be 
ascribed, one could ask the question: what is i 's evaluation of this 'second' order Jevel?, and we 
would be led to an infinite number of introspection levels, which is far to be intuitive. (Neglnt) 
says that if formula efJ is not believed at level g, then i believes, in the standard sense, that </J 
is not believed at level g. Note that the justification of (Neglnt) is similar to the justification 
of (Poslnt). The axiom (SubstReg) concems the conditional connective -=}h ; it says that in the 
formula cp -=}h 1/f, both cp and 1/f can be substituted by logically equivalent formulas. (Detach) 
states that if efJ entails 1/f at level h, then if efJ holds, 1/f holds at level h. Note that '1/f holds at 
level h' is an abbreviation for 'True -=}h cp'. The axiom (Trans) says that there exists a fonction 
F such that if n = F(h1,k1,h2 ,k2), then if efJ entails 1/f at level h1, cp /\ 1/f entails 0 at level k1, </J
entails -,Vf at the level h2 and cp /\ -,'ljf entails 0 at level k2 , then </J entails 0 at level n. This axiom
seems quite complex but it is mandatory since, in general, from (</J -=}h1 1/J) /\ (c/J /\ 1/f -=} k1 0), we 
cannot infer what is the value of n such that: cp -=}n 0, because there may be cp worlds that are 0 
worlds and which are not 1/f worlds. Notice that axiom schema (Trans) is perfectly compatible 
with conditional probabilities if we accept some uniform distribution assumptions. In this case, 
the form of Fis n = (h1 x k1) + (h2 x k2). Even if this is not a sufficient justification, by analogy 
with conditional probabilities we have adopted the following fonction F: n = Max{Min{h1, kt}, 
Min{h2, k2}}. The axiom (UnicReg) states that the regularity level of efJ entails 1/1 is unique whereas 
(MinReg) ensures that cp entails 1/f at the minimum level iff efJ implies -,Vf. The intuitive idea is 
that cp -=}min 1/J holds iff the set of efJ worlds and the set of 1/J worlds are disjointed. The sentence 
cp -=}min 1/J can be interpreted in the context of conditional probabilities as O = Pr( 1/f lc/J). According 
to axiom (MaxReg), a formula cp entails 1/J at the maximum level iff efJ implies 1/J. The intuitive 
idea is that efJ -=}max 1/f holds iff the set of cp worlds is included into the set of 1/f worlds. Note 
that the sentence cp -=}max 1/J can be interpreted in the context of conditional probabilities as 1 =
Pr( 1/J I efJ). The last axiom (DetachBel) follows from the axioms (Max Tau), (ClosConj), (SubstBel) 
and (Weak). 
In the sequel, ,C' will denote the extended language and 1-* the extended logic, i.e. the logic 1-
extended with the previous axioms. 
5.2. Preference-based argumentation for graded trust 
There is a clear consensus in the literature that arguments do not necessarily have the same strength. 
It may be the case that an argument relies on certain information while another argument is built on 
less certain information, or that an argument promo tes an important value while another promotes a 
weaker one. In both cases, the former argument is clearly stronger than the latter. These differences 
in arguments' strengths make it possible to compare them. Consequently, several preference rela­
tions between arguments have been defined in the literature (Amgoud, 1999; Benferhat, Dubois, & 
Prade, 1993; Cayrol, Royer, & Saurel, 1993; Simari & Loui, 1992). There is also a consensus on the 
fact that preferences should be taken into account in the evaluation of arguments (see Amgoud & 
Cayrol, 2002; Bench-Capon, 2003; Modgil, 2009; Prakken & Sartor, 1997; Simari & Loui, 1992). 
ln Amgoud and Cayrol (2002), a first abstract preference-based argumentation framework 
was proposed. lt takes as input a set of arguments, an attack relation, and a preference relation è: 
between arguments. For two arguments a and b, a è= b me ans that the argument ais at least as strong 
as b. The relation è: is abstract and can be instantiated in different ways. However, it is assumed 
to be a (total or partial) pre-ordering (i.e. reflexive and transitive). The strict version associated 
with è: is denoted by >- and is defined as follows: a >- b iff a è= b and not b è= a. Whatever the 
source of this preference relation is, the idea is to ignore an attack if the attacked argument is 
stronger than its attacker. Dung's semantics are applied on the remaining attacks. This approach is 
particularly interesting when the attack relation is symmetric. However, when the attack relation 
is not symmetric like the relation given in Definition 4.17, the extensions of the argumentation 
framework may be conflicting leading thus to counter-intuitive results. Consequently, Amgoud 
and Vesic (2009) proposed a new approach which consists of inverting the direction of an attack 
whenever the attacker is weaker than its target as follows: 
DEFINITION 5 .1 Let (A, R, è:) be an argumentation framework. For two arguments a, b E A, 
adefeats b iff 
• aRb and not b >- a or
• bRa and a >- b
Dung's semantics are then applied to the new framework (A, def eats) for evaluating the 
arguments. In what follows, we propose an instantiation of this abstract framework for reasoning 
about graded trust. As in the binary case, we assume a know ledge base JC containing the beliefs 
of an agent i. Formulas of Ki are elements of the extended language ,C'. Arguments are built from 
Ki following Definition 4.4, however by replacing the relation 1- by 1-*. 
DEFINITION 5.2 Let Ki be a beliefs base of agent i. An argument is a pair (H, h) where: 
• H s; Ki and h E ,C'
• H is consistent
• H 1--* h
• �H' c H such that H' 1--* h
Arguments attack each other as shown in Definition 4.17, i.e. the relation used in the binary 
case. However, the y may have diff erent strength levels. It is the strength lev el of the weakest ( or the 
less certain) formula used in its support. 
In K; we have the argument as. 
as = (Hs, hs), where Hs is {Belf4 (ln!J,imeeting), Belf2 (ln!J,imeeting--+ meeting), Belf4 
(meeting--+ -,office)} and hs = Belf2 (ln!J,imeeting /\meeting/\ -,office) and Level(as) = g2. 
We may have a more complex knowledge base K? where is represented the fact that if Luis is 
teaching, he cannot be attending a meeting. 
K;' = {Belf4 (parking), Belf2 (parking--+ office), Belf4 (ln!J,imeeting), 
Belf2 (ln!J,imeeting--+ meeting), Belf4 (meeting--+ -,office), Belf4 (teaching), Belf4 
(teaching --+ -,meeting)} 
Now, we have the argument a6: 
a6 = (H6,h6) where H6 is {Belf
4 (teaching),Belf4 (teaching--+ -,meeting)} and h6 =
Belf4 (teaching /\ -,meeting) and Level(a6) = g4.
Since the consequence h6 of a6 is BeF4 (teaching /\ -,meeting) and in the support H3 of a3 we 
have Belf3 (meeting), we can accept, thanks to a limited change in the attack definition, that a6 
attacks a3 . Moreover, we have Level(a6) > Level(a3), then we can infer that a6 defeats a3 . 
6. Related work
Trust modelling has become a hot topic during the last 10 years. More than 20 definitions were 
proposed for this complex concept. Among others the following one was proposed by Falcone and 
Castelfranchi (2001): 
Trust is a mental state, a complex attitude of an agent i towards another agent} about the behaviour / action
a relevant for the goal g. 
Gambetta (1990) defines trust as a subjective probability by which an agent i expects that 
another agent j performs a given action on which its welfare depends. In Liau (2003), trust is 
represented as agent's beliefs and the author focused on trust in validity and its impact on the 
assimilation of information received from the trustee. The basic idea is the following: if agent 
i believes that agent j has told him or her the truth of cp and i trusts the judgment of j on cp,
then i will also believe cp. Our formalism follows this line of research and considers six forms 
of trust including validity, sincerity, and competence. It shows how to build arguments in favour 
(respectively, against) each form of trust, and how to use beliefs conceming the trustworthiness 
of the other agents in order to infer new beliefs. 
Sorne attempts on combining argumentation theory and trust have been made in the literature. 
Based on the representation proposed in Liau (2003), Villata, Boella, Gabbay, and van der Torre 
(2011) presented an instantiation of the meta-argumentation model Boella, Gabbay, van der Torre, 
and Villata (2009) for reasoning about trust in validity. The technique of meta-argumentation 
applies Dung' s theory of abstract argumentation to itself. The instantiation con tains arguments 
built from beliefs and meta-arguments. An example of a meta argument is of the form Trusti 
meaning that 'agent i is trustable'. Our formalism is more general since it reasons about more 
forms of trust. Moreover, it is much more simple since it instantiates directly Dung's framework 
with a clear and intuitive logical language in which various kinds of beliefs are represented. 
An argumentation-based model for reasoning about inconsistent and uncertain information 
was proposed in Tang, Cai, McBumey, Sklar, and Parsons (2012). It is as an instantiation of 
the preference-based argumentation framework proposed in Amgoud and Cayrol (2002) where 
arguments do not necessarily have the same strengths and are thus compared using a binary relation 
expressing preferences. The arguments are built from a base which contains beliefs pervaded with 
degrees of certainty. These degrees are then combined for computing the certainty levels of the 
supports of arguments which in tum are used for comparing arguments. The particularity of the 
model is the use of trusted information in order to assign degrees for inferred beliefs. Indeed, 
the model takes as input a simple network whose nodes are agents and edges represent trust 
relationships between nodes. For instance, an arc from agent i towards agent j means that agent 
i trusts agent j. Weights are associated with edges and express degrees of trust. Our formalism is 
based on a richer model of trust. It distinguishes between six forms of trusts instead of an absolu te 
trust in Tang et al. (2012). Moreover, our formalism not only uses trusted information in order to 
infer new beliefs but also reasons about trust itself and infers beliefs about trust. 
More recently, in Parsons et al. (2012) the authors focused on identifying 10 sources of trust 
and presented them in terms of argument schemes, i.e. syllogisms justifying trustworthiness in 
an agent. Examples of sources are authority, reputation and expert opinion which is called in our 
formalism competence. Critical questions showing how each argument scheme can be attacked 
were also proposed. While some of the proposed sources make sense, others are debatable. For 
instance, trust because of pragmatism says that an agent i may decide to trust another agent j 
because it serves i's interests to do so. There is a form of wishful thinking which is not compatible 
with the fact that trust is a belief. 
Another interesting contribution on the combination of argumentation theory and trust was 
done in Stranders, de Weerdt, and Witteveen (2007). The focus is on computing to what extent 
agent i trusts agent}. This is done from statistical data and arguments. The model is an instantiation 
of the abstract decision model proposed in Amgoud and Prade (2009). Our formalism does not 
use statistical data. Moreover, it is an inference model and not a decision making one. 
Finally, in Matt et al. (2010) the authors proposed a model for evaluating the trust an agent 
may have in another. For that purpose, arguments in favour of trust are built. They are mainly 
grounded on statistical data which makes this approach different from the one we followed in the 
present paper. 
7. Conclusion
This paper tackled the important questions of formalising and reasoning about trust in information 
sources. It proposed a formal model based on the construction and evaluation of arguments. The 
model presents several advantages: first, it is grounded on an accurate and simple logical lan­
guage for representing trust in information sources. Indeed, modal logic is used for distinguishing 
between what is true (respectively, false) and what is believed by an agent. Second, unlike exist­
ing works that define absolute trust in an agent, our model uses a fine-grained notion of trust. It 
distinguishes between six forms of trust including trust in the sincerity of an agent and trust in 
his competence. The third feature of our model is that it plays two distinct roles: (i) it shows how 
to take into account trust in information sources in order to deal and reason about information 
coming from those sources, (ii) it shows whether to trust or not a given source of information on 
the basis of available beliefs. This makes our model a good candidate for dialogue systems. 
There are a number of ways to extend this work. Our future direction consists of investigating 
the properties of the model un der other semantics, namely preferred semantics. We have shown that 
the attack relations we have defined are very special since they are not grounded on inconsistency. 
Consequently, despite the fact that arguments are consistent, self-attacking arguments may exist 
preventing thus the existence of stable extensions. 
Another interesting future direction consists of refining the logical language by considering the 
notion of tapie. The basic idea is to represent information such as: Agent i trusts the competence of 
agent} in psychology but not in philosophy. Our formal definitions can be extended in this direction 
thanks to the logic of aboutness developed by Demolombe and Jones ( 1995). The logical language 
of this logic contains a predicate A (t, cp) whose intuitive meaning is that formula</> is about topic 
t. This predicate can be used, for instance, for expressing the fact that i trusts j in his validity for
any sentence about a given topic t: \lx(A(t,x)----+ TrustVal(i,j,x). Another direction consists of
handling graded trust. In the proposed model, trust is a binary notion: an agent either fully trusts 
another agent or fully distrust the agent. However, in everyday life one may have a limited trust 
in a person. It is thus important to define to what extent an agent trusts another. 
Notes 
1. Sometimes we abuse notation and write Beli(</>) instead of Beli<P•
2. We use the same notations for the minimal element and for the maximal element in GRB and in GRR
while they are not necessarily identical. The context allows us to avoid ambiguities.
3. Notice thatD(</> ➔ l/l)(respectively,D(</> ➔ -,l/l)) does not mean that </> ➔ l/l(respectively,</> ➔ -,l/1)
is a valid formula.
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